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IN THE SUPREME COURT
oF· THE STATE OF UTAH

lJC>S ~ ~LD \\' J Ll~E.~l.SON,
~·
Plmntzfj, Appellant,
YS.

.JOH~

i ·tali

\Y. TURNER, \Varcle11,

~tate

Prison,
Defendant, Respondent

(

)

Case No.
10858

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

S'LATE.\IEN'l' OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Donald \Vilkerson, was convicted
1f the crime of third degree burglary in the District
Court of the Second .Judicial District, Davis County,
~..;ta te of LT tah. From this conviction an appeal was
taken. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah upheld the cotffiction. The instant appeal is from a denial
of plaiu~iff\ petition for habeas corpus seeking his re1

1

lease from confinement in the Utah State p .
.
Tison
reason of the 1udgment and commitment d 01·
or er a .1
result of the burglary conviction.
~

DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
Appellant filed his petition for writ of habea
S COi'·
pus in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County
State of Utah on October 24, 1966. On December ~
1
1966, a hearing was held before the Honorable Brvan·
II. Croft, District Judge. The court entered its me~or.
andum decision denying appellant's petition on Febru.
ary 9, 1967.
On March l, 1967, appellant filed a Notice
Appeal from the court's decision.

oi

STATE1\1:ENT OF FACTS
Respondent essentially agrees with the statemeni
of facts as presented in appellant's brief, but wishe1
to point out that the question of whether or not appellant
had waiYed his right to counsel in the interrogation
conducted in Jerome, Idaho, is one of the questions to
be decided by this appeal.
Therefore, respondent objects to the statement on
page 4 of appellant's brief that appellant was ques.:
tioned "without being properly represented by counsel.
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POINT I
"~FPELLANT 'VAS IN NO WAY PRE-

THE REFUSAL OF THE
1_ LdI ::/L'ATE SCPREIVIE COURT TO APpoJX'i' A SECOND ATTORNEY FOR THE
p L'HPUSE OF 1\SSISTING HEVI IN HIS AP\ ~'~"-~L \\'HEX THE RECORD SHO,VS THAT
THE UHIGIXAL APPOINTED ATTORNEY
coL-LD Fl:\D NO J\IERITORIOUS GROUNDS
FOR _\PPEAL.

.J t JHCED

BY

Respondent readily admits that the requirements
. ; th:· :)ixth .. \mendment can only be satisfied when an
,'z:d1.-,ed h:t; been afforded the opportunity to retain
c(Junsel t\1 assist him in his defense. In addition to the
-:uleguard of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution
r: the State of Utah, art. I,§ 12, specifically states that:
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
haYe the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel."

It seems clear that the United States Supreme
l'mrrt has extended this right to include the post-con-, ,ction stage as well as preliminary and trial stages in
a crimillal prosecution. In Dougla.s v. California, 372
P.S. 363 ( 19t)3), the United States Supreme Court
J1nalidated a system whereby the intermediate appellate
court would examine the merits of a proposed appeal
hv an indigent com-icted of a crime. If the court found
'olllc' merit to the appeal it would appoint counsel to
rqJresrnt the accused and assist him in his appeal. If

3

no meritorious points were found the court would ,
.
~~
appomtments of counsel and the accused wa , ll ,
S a O\\'t1l
to prosecute the appeal pro se. The Suprem C
e our:
held that such a system violated the right of an
,·
accuse1i
to the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteentl1
Amendment ..Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
"In spite of California's forward treatm 1
· d'igen t s, un der its
· present practice the t,en
o f. m
of an appeal a person is afforded in the Dist~P.~
Court of Appeal hinges
upon whether or not ;chl
.
can pay f or t he assistance of counsel. If he can
the appellate court passes on the merits of hii
case only after having the full benefit of writter
briefs and oral argument by counsel. If he cannot the appellate court is forced to prejudge the
merits before it can even determine whether
counsel should be provided." Id. at 355-56.
1

In so stating, the court agreed with the position
taken by Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court who said that:
"Denial of counsel on appeal [to an indigent!
would seem to be a discrimination at least at invidious as that condemned in Griffin v. Illinois . ... '' People v. Brown, 55 Cal.2d 64, 71,3ji
P.2d 1072, 1076 (1960) (concurring opinion).
In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 ( 1956), the Unitea
States Supreme Court held that a state may not grant
appellate review in such a way as to discriminate againsl
some convicted defendants on account of their poverty.
The question in issue was the right of an indigent to a
free transcript on appeal. In both the DougW.s case ano

4

(iri7]1,1 case tlic eYil was the same, discrimination
, ,ai 11 st the indigent.
1

(-(1

Fr•mJ tiie'>e tases it is readily apparent that an in<li,'-' .~ ,~ ch~1ded to the same protection as that accorcle<l
:, (:'(Jernlant of means.
Tue sLtutes of Utah and court pronouncements mt

;iemonstrate that this state has recognized
L!K r1gi1t of an al'.cused to counsel at preliminary and
~'i:'.i ~tuµ,e:-i as well as post-conviction proceedings. Utah
~·(J(t'. , . 1lrl. ;· 77-L:J-1 ( 1953) states:

i

1

1,

.~u

·let

.. \ Yhe11 fre defendant is brought before the

11utg·1slra t e Ll pon an arrest, either with or without

a charge of having committed a
offense triable, or on information or in1:1c1cmc1t, t~1e magistrate must immediately inil'l·m him of the charge against him and of his
right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the
proceeding.''
a

\\·arr;lt1t, 011

1J~;h]w

Tu c'.!.i-; the Ctah State Supreme Court has added:
'·The preYr1iling opinion correctly indicates
that the right to have the assistance of counsel
at ewry stage of the proceedings includes the
rigl1t to counsel at the arraignment, at the pre'.im:uary hearing and at all subsequent proceedings." State v. Braasch, 119 Utah 450, 4G4, 229
P.2cl :280, :295 (1951) (concurring opinion).
Respondent agrees that the Constitution of the
~ '1iited States as well as the Constitution and case law
rd' the State of Gtah extend to an accused the right to
cuun'icl in all proceedings as one of the fundamental
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rights of all citizens. The case of State v. Hine r· .
s, 6 uta.
.
.
.
'
2d 126, 307 P .2d 887 ( 1957) is especially appro .
Pria\..
liere. 'l'lie U ta h Supreme Court stated at 6 lTtah
11
131, 307 P.2d 891:
.i,
"The privilege of an accused to the assi'st·

?f counse1 is· one of t he fundamental rights.antt

11

1s more than empty form; it means the right 1'
11
a reputable member of the bar who is williJ
and in a positi~n to honestly and conscientiou.:fi:
represent the mterests of a defendent and ·
present such def eris es as are available to hrni
under the law and consistent with the ethics r
the profession." (Emphasis added.)
!!

Appellant in the instant case had appointed ti1
represent him in his appeal a member of the bar w!\11
considerable experience and reputation in handlini
criminal matters. Nowhere does appellant claim thai
.Mr. :M:itsunaga did not honestly and conscientious!)·
represent his interest. The fact is that after a thoroug~
examination of the trial transcript Mr. Mitsunaga cou!J
not find any meritorious issues upon which, in hi~
opinion, the case could be reversed. Certainly, an attor·
ney cannot be required to do more. If no defenses w
available to him under the law he cannot be required
to manufacture such defenses just to please his client.
To do so would certainly not be consistent with thr
ethics of the profession.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court
in Ellis v. U.S., 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958), stated in:1
per curium opinion:

6

"If counsel is convinced, after conscientious
inyestigation, that the appeal is frivolous, of
course, he may ask to withdraw on that account.
If the court is satisfied that counsel has diligently investigated the possible grounds of appeal, and agrees with counsel's evaluation of the
case, the leave to withdraw may be allowed and
leave to appeal may be denied."
See also Hardy v. U.S., 375 U.S. 277 (1964).

Tile instant case bears marked resemblance to
Staumorc v. People, 157 Colo. 207, 401 P.2d 829
( 19G5) In that case the conviction of Stanmore for
robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery had been
affirmed on a pro se appeal. Stanmore v. People, 146
Colo. 41415, 362 P .2d 1042 ( 1962), cert. den. 368 U.S.
993 ( 1962) . Stanmore then petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus contending that he had been denied the
right to counsel on his appeal. The Supreme Court of
Colorado ordered the trial court to appoint counsel for
him with the instruction that the appointed counsel be
directed to examine the trial record to determine whether
any reversible error had occurred during the trial which
had not been presented on appeal. Counsel was also
directed to examine the briefs to determine if the
matter~ raised on appeal had been adequately presented.
He was then to submit a brief in support of any matters
not brought before the court in the appeal. After examination of the record and the appeal briefs, counsel
concluded that no additional grounds for an appeal
were present and that all points had been adequately

7

presented. In upholding the conviction the c ·t
ou1 sl·i'
at 157 Colo. 209, .:1<Ql P.2d 830:
'' tl
1

1

:'The matter having been presented t0 ..
tlus light by the brief of the competent , Us 1'1
.
i
couml 1
appomtec pursuant to• .order of this cou J,
·t I\[.
dl
t
d
now a iere o our ec1s10n . as reported in '1111.
S't
more v. P cop l e, supra. It is our firm cou ··t·
ti1~1 t w 1u'} e me
. 1·igent cf ef,eudants convicted\JC11111·.
111
crime are certainly entitled to haYe counsel , '
poi~ted a~ ~tate expense to represent them",~'.:
renew, [ c1tmg Douglas 'l'. California], they ;in
not entitlec~ to r~qu.ire the state to searci1 for
counsel until one is found who will contend tlw
there was error in the trial.
"This is in contrast to the rule which demanrh
that everyone be afforded counsel at his trrnl.
At the trial. the issue is guilt or innocence, an,!
the determination of the issues must, bv consti
tutional right, be by a jury. On review, hoicem.
the issue is not guilt or innocence, hut whet/1 1,
errors of law have been committed which u:a1T1w
reversal of the conviction. 'Vhen an able laww1
appointed by the state, after conscientious ~wl
diligent investigation, determines that 1111
grounds of error exist, the defendant may o!
course, continue to prosecute his writ of error.
but not, in our view, with counsel paid for O)
the state." (Emphasis added.)
1

In State v. Burrell, 96 Ariz. 233, 393 P.2d 9Zl
( 1964), defendant, after having been comicted ol'
escape and robbery, requested appointment of counsel
to assist him in his appeal. Counsel was appointed a1111
after searching the record reported to the Arizorn:
Supreme Court that he 1rns unable to find grounds for

8

I

appeal. In accordance with an Arizona statute which
requires the court to search the record for fundamental
error in all criminal appeals, the court ordered the record submitted. After reviewing the record, the court
,tfi'irmed the conviction stating at 96 Ariz. 235, 393
P.2d 923:

"The counsel appointed by the court has acted
as an advocate for the defendant, and not as
amicus curiae. 'Ve are satisfied that he has made
a conscientious investigation, and agree with his
conclq.,sion that there are no grounds for a
successful appeal."

People v. Tabb, 156 Cal. App.2d 467, 319
P.2d 656 ( 1957) ; State v. Ortiz, 98 Ariz. 65, 402 P.2d
H ( 196.5); Richardson v. Willard, 241 Ore. 376, 406
P.2d 156 (1965).
~ee abo,

The similarities between the instant case and the
Burrell case are readily apparent. In both cases a competent and experienced attorney was appointed to represent the appellant. In both cases the attorney could·
find no meritorious points for appeal and communicated
his conclusion to the court. Finally, in both cases the
court had an opportunity to review the record. In the
instant case that opportunity was afforded by appellant's pro se appeal. State v. Wilkerson, 17 Utah 2d
353, 412 P.2d 312 ( 1966). The Utah Supreme Court
after examining the brief submitted by appellant and
studying the record found the appeal to be without
merit and affirmed appellant's conviction.

9

Respondent, therefore, submits that appell
. .
.
ant liao
.t equate counsel to aid m his appeal and th· t ·
a it \1·1
not the duty of counsel to manufacture point :'.
•
S to Iii
subn11tted for appeal. Appellant was in no ..
. .
,
>\a~ pr,
1ud1ced by the Utah Supreme Courts refusal to, .
appo1111
subsequent counsel.
.d

POINT II
APPELLANT 'VAS ADEQUATELY I\.
FORl\IED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL
AND HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELF'-INCRDll.
NATION AND NO PREJUDICE RESi!LTED·
FRO~I THE ADl\IISSION OF TESTDIOXY
OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF JERO)IE
IDAHO.
The Supreme Court of the United States has see1
fit to limit the effect of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 L.S
.J.36 ( 1966) , to cases in which the trial began after
June 13, 1966. The constitutional requirements ~et
forth in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),ari
to be effective in trials beginning after June 2:2, lDIJJ
.Johnson v. New .Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). There·i
fore, the effect of the Miranda decision has no bearin~
on the arrest and interrogation of appellant and di"
cussion of the constitutional requirements of Mirandn
are unnecessary to the decision of the instant case.
I

The constitutional requirements of Escobedo, how·
ever, are applicable to the arrest and interrogation ol'
appellant and if the admissions of appellant made lo

10

the Jerome City Police Chief are to be considered admissable iu appellant's trial, the constitutional requirements of Escobedo must have been met.

In Escobedo the Supreme Court said at 378 U.S.
490:

·'VVe hold, therefore, that where, as here, the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unso!Yed crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect has been taken
into police custody, the polic~ carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult \vith his lawyer, and the police have not
effectivelv warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has
been denied 'the assistance of counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as 'made obligatory upon the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment,' Gideon v. Wainwright, 37~ U.S. at 342, and that no statement
elicited by the police during the interrogation
may be used against him at a criminal trial."
The crucial question in the instant case is whether
or not the principles set out in Escobedo were met at
the interrogation of appellant. It is clear that when
appellant was taken into custody and before any questioning was attempted, he was informed that he did
not have to make any statement and that anything he
did say could be used against him. He was also told
that he had the right to consult an attorney. During his
trial the following exchange took place between appel-

11

lant's attorney and Chief Yingst of the J
.
eroine lrl ,
I >olice Department:
' Ui11
"Q. [By 1\ilr. Stratford] 'Vhen ~·ou , . t
. ·1
'
·•en u .
tlie .Jal
, when you were there and t 1 lk d Piu
did vou tell him he had the right t; g.e to huu,
stat~ment whatever?
ive you n"

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did you tell him he had the right to co
an attorney ?
nsu 1r
A. Yes, I did. And I told him right there.

Q. And you also told him, did you not, that am ,
statement he gave, of course, you could '
. t }um.
. l
U.\t
agams
A. That's right, I did.
Q. Do you know if he had an opportunity 1
obtain counsel?
11

A. I don't know. He said, 'I don't want
attorney' the day I talked to him.

u; 1

Q. He didn't want an attorney?
A. That's right."
(Ex. P-9 at 57).

From this it can be seen that appellant was in·
formed of his rights at the time of his arrest and 1m
afforded an opportunity to obtain counsel, which he
rejected, choosing instead to make an admission of the
burglaries in Idaho and Utah in order that he might he
returned to Utah for trial. (Ex. P-9 at 49). It is true
that appellant later secured the services of an attorne1
and before his questioning in the Jerome Jail requestea
that his attorney be present. His attorney stated that

12

,

he did '"not necessarily" wish to be present at the q uestioning. (Ex. P-9 at 62-63). Appellant had already
made statements implicating himself in both the Utal 1
and Idaho burglaries after being informed of his constitutional rights. When told that his attorney did not
wish to be present he knew at that time from the prerious statements by the interrogating officers that he
did not have to make any further statements and that
he could insist that his attorney be present or could
ilbtain another counsel. Appellant voluntarily chose to
continue and make further admissions; in so doing, he
waiYed his right to object to the absence of counsel.
Respondent, therefore, submits that appellant was
adequately informed of his rights at the time of his
:irrest and that he knew of his rights at the subsequent
,1ucstioning that took place in the Jerome City Jail.
His failure to insist that his counsel be present was a
rnlid voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. All of
the requirements of Escobedo were met and appellant
was afforded all of his constitutional rights.

POINT III
APPELLANT VIOLATED THE CONDITIONS OF HIS CONDITION AL TERMIN ATION BY REMAINING IN UTAH AFTER
HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON AND PARTICIPATING IN A BURGLARY AND HIS RETURN TO UTAH TO FACE CHRGES WAS A
VOLUNTARY DECISION.

13

The Board of Pardons has been invested . 1
.
W1tn \Ii
duty to determme the conditions under whicl1 ·
•
.
u1n1ath
may be released from pnson on parole or I ..
la\ e then
sentences terminated. Utah Code Ann ; . . ,.
.
~
I 1-U·!.'
( 1953) . It has been held by the U tab Suprein C·'
e oun
that the Board of Pardons has plenarv pow . t
"
er o ~t'
the conditions under which a termination of ,,eu
c
t ,
euet
may be granted and terminating a sentence upon COli(J1,
tion that prisoner agree to leave the state is not uii co11.
stitutional as amounting to a banishment. Man.1c/i .
Turner, 14 Utah 2d 352, 384 P.2d 294 (1903). Sec
also, In re Cmnmarata, 341 .Mich. 528, 67 N.W.2d 6i;
( 1954), cert. den. 349 U.S. 953 ( 1955).
1

All prisoners released on parole remain in Jeg:ii
custody and are subject at any time to being returne1I
to the prison and their release voided until such time :h
sentence is terminated. The Board of Pardons is girelt
full power to retake and reimprison any comic! on
parole. Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-16 ( 1953). In McCo,"
t'. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945), the
Utah Supreme Court held that a parolee is still in legal
custody and control of the Board of Pardons em
though outside the prison walls and the Board has the
power to revoke parole without affording the prisoner
any hearing.
The terms of appeallant's release required that hr
depart immediately from the State and not return for
anv purpose. (Ex~ P-1) Appellant was released on
N ~vember 10, 1964, but chose to ignore the conditiom

14

of bis release and remained in Utah at least long enough
tc participate in a burglary on November 22, 1964. Renwining in Utah for that length of time constituted a
riolation of his release agreement wherein he agreed to
leave Ctah immediately. This violation was sufficient
to warant the revocation of conditional termination even
111 the absence of any other violations.
Furthermore, appellant's return to Utah was
roluntary. It is true he faced charges in Idaho, but he
rnluntarily chose to return to Utah to face the charges
made against him here. He knew that in returning he
He could have
1 iolated his conditional termination.
:iroided the possibility of revocation by remaining in
Iclaho and facing the charges made against him there.
ffhether the revocation of his conditional termination
•1·as based upon his failure to leave the state immediately
after his release or upon his return to the state to face
criminal charges is immaterial. Under the power given
to the .Board of Pardons to set conditions for termination of sentence and the power to retain custody over
a released prisoner, the Board could have validly rernked the termination order for either reason.
It is submitted, therefore, that appellant violated
the terms of his conditional release and the Board acted
within its statutory powers in revoking appellant's conditional termination of sentence.

15

CONCLUSION
Appellant's contentions on appeal are totally
without merit. No case exists for reversal or dischar e
of appeallant from incarceration. Therefore, respon~.
ent submits that the judgment of the District Court
denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas c0 rpus
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
LEROY S. AXLAND
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol

Salt Lake City, Utah 84-114
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